Authors: James Pamment & Darejan Tsurtsumia
Published by: Psychological Defence Agency & Lund University (MPF Report Series 8/2025)
Date: May 2025
Background and Purpose
“Beyond Operation Doppelgänger” is a comprehensive assessment of the Russian Social Design Agency (SDA) and its role in orchestrating large-scale information influence operations, particularly those known collectively as the ‘Doppelgänger campaign.’ Drawing on over 3,000 leaked internal documents from the SDA, the report critically examines the capabilities, methods, internal communications, and strategic objectives of the SDA and its network. The authors challenge prevailing narratives about Doppelgänger, arguing that Western analyses have often misunderstood both the scale and intent of these operations. This is my summary and overview of this publication. Please contact me if you would like a copy of the full report.
1. The Nature and Scale of Operation Doppelgänger
- Doppelgänger is widely cited as one of the most persistent and complex Russian disinformation campaigns since the Ukraine invasion, involving the cloning of legitimate news and government websites to spread pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian narratives.
- The operation, attributed to SDA, Structura, and related organizations, has produced tens of thousands of pieces of content and millions of comments, targeting audiences in Europe, the US, and beyond.
- However, the report argues that Doppelgänger is not a standalone operation but rather one delivery method among many within a much broader Kremlin-directed information war. The real innovation lies in the SDA’s ability to adapt, scale, and rebrand its tactics as needed.
2. Strategic Context and Organizational Structure
- SDA operates within a €600 million-a-year Kremlin-backed ecosystem of private and non-commercial actors, overseen by the Russian Presidential Administration, particularly Sergei Kiriyenko.
- Decision-making is highly centralized and personality-driven, with rapid, top-down directives and a focus on quick, high-volume output rather than quality or subtlety.
- The SDA and its close partner Structura function as a single entity, sharing staff, resources, and even physical addresses, despite presenting themselves as separate organizations for procurement and public relations purposes.
3. Tactics, Techniques, and Capabilities
- Content Production: SDA acts as a “content factory,” producing articles, memes, AI-generated comments, and videos at industrial scale. These are distributed through bot networks, paid ads, fake personas, and sleeper social media groups.
- Dissemination: The group uses spam-like tactics, flooding platforms with low-quality links and comments, expecting most to be ignored but counting on a constant presence to achieve “market share” in the information environment.
- Measurement: Success is measured not by genuine persuasion but by penetration-how often narratives are repeated in Western media, fact-checked, or denounced. Being exposed is considered a victory, as it demonstrates reach and impact to Kremlin sponsors.
- Adaptation: Exposure of Doppelgänger led to increased Kremlin funding for SDA, which quickly adapted by shifting tactics and exploiting notoriety as evidence of effectiveness.
- Hybrid Methods: The SDA blends advertising, political campaigning, espionage, and military logic, targeting both Western and Russian audiences with tailored narratives.
4. Related Campaigns and Ecosystem
- Doppelgänger is just one part of a wider set of operations, including “Recent Reliable News” (RRN), “War on Fakes,” “Matryoshka/Overload,” and “Undercut,” each using different platforms and delivery mechanisms but sharing personnel, infrastructure, and objectives.
- These campaigns often overlap, with new brands and methods constantly being tested and deployed to evade detection and maximize disruption.
5. Impact and Implications
- The SDA’s real achievement is not in the sophistication of its fakes, but in its ability to overwhelm the information environment, tie up the resources of fact-checkers, and exploit Western media’s focus on exposure.
- The report warns that existing Western countermeasures are ill-suited to chronic, adaptive campaigns like those run by SDA. The “counter-FIMI” (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) community is often manipulated into amplifying SDA’s reach by publicizing and debunking its content.
Critical Insights and Recommendations
- Misunderstood Threat: The Western focus on technical aspects of Doppelgänger has obscured the strategic picture. SDA’s operations are best understood as part of a long-term, state-sanctioned information war, not as isolated campaigns.
- Success Through Notoriety: For SDA, being detected and discussed in the West is a metric of success. Exposure is repackaged as evidence of impact, justifying further Kremlin investment.
- Need for Strategic Countermeasures: The report calls for a rethinking of Western countermeasures, emphasizing the need for strategies that address the systemic nature of Russian information warfare, rather than just tactical responses to individual incidents.
- Community Vulnerabilities: The counter-FIMI community must be wary of being drawn into SDA’s playbook, where fact-checking and exposure serve the adversary’s objectives as much as the defenders’.
“Beyond Operation Doppelgänger” reframes the understanding of Russian digital propaganda, positioning the SDA as a central, entrepreneurial actor in a new generation of Kremlin-backed influence operations. The report urges policymakers, researchers, and practitioners to move beyond reactive, technical responses and to develop holistic, strategic approaches that address the evolving threat landscape of state-sponsored information warfare.
The SDA stands for the Social Design Agency (in Russian: Агентство Социального Проектирования, АСП). It is a Russian public relations and digital influence firm that has become a central actor in the Kremlin’s modern information warfare and disinformation campaigns, particularly since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
What is the Social Design Agency (SDA)?
- Nature and Role:
The SDA is a Kremlin-backed entity tasked with designing, coordinating, and executing large-scale information influence operations. It operates within a €600 million-a-year ecosystem of private and non-commercial organizations under the oversight of the Russian Presidential Administration, specifically Sergei Kiriyenko.. SDA’s activities are part of a state-sanctioned, long-term strategy to destabilize Ukraine, undermine Western democracies, and promote Russian interests globally. - Leadership and Structure:
SDA was founded by Ilya Gambashidze, with Nikolay Tupikin as CEO and co-owner of its close partner, Structura National Technologies. These two organizations function as a single entity, sharing staff, resources, and even office addresses, despite presenting themselves as separate for procurement and public relations. - Methods and Campaigns:
SDA is best known internationally for orchestrating the so-called “Doppelgänger” campaign-a sprawling network of fake news sites, cloned legitimate media, and social media manipulation designed to spread pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian narratives.. However, Doppelgänger is just one of many delivery mechanisms. SDA’s tactics include:- Creating fake websites and spoofing news outlets
- Running bot farms and fake social media accounts
- Generating AI-driven content, memes, and videos at industrial scale
- Buying social media ads to amplify divisive narratives
- Attempting to incite real-world protests and unrest in Europe.
- Strategic Approach:
SDA’s operations are highly adaptive, measuring success not by genuine persuasion but by the penetration of their narratives into Western media and public discourse. Being fact-checked or exposed is considered a victory, as it demonstrates reach and impact to Kremlin sponsors. - Sanctions and Exposure:
The UK, US, EU, and other Western governments have sanctioned SDA, its leadership, and its partner organizations for their roles in destabilizing Ukraine and interfering in Western democracies.. Despite sanctions, SDA has continued to adapt and evolve its tactics. - Comparison to Previous Actors:
SDA is often compared to the now-defunct Internet Research Agency (IRA), but is seen as part of a new generation of Russian digital propaganda, blending advertising, political campaigning, espionage, and military logic.
Summary Table
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| Full Name | Social Design Agency (SDA) |
| Russian Name | Агентство Социального Проектирования (АСП) |
| Leadership | Ilya Gambashidze (Founder), Nikolay Tupikin (CEO/Structura) |
| Core Activities | Disinformation, digital propaganda, social media manipulation, fake news, incitement efforts |
| Main Campaigns | Doppelgänger, Recent Reliable News, War on Fakes, Matryoshka/Overload, Undercut |
| Kremlin Connection | Direct funding and oversight via the Presidential Administration (Sergei Kiriyenko) |
| Sanctions | UK, US, EU, and others have imposed asset freezes and bans on SDA and its leaders |
| Strategic Goal | Destabilize Ukraine, undermine Western support, sow division, and amplify Kremlin narratives |
| Notable Tactics | Mirror sites, bot networks, AI content, paid ads, real-world incitement |
| Partner Organizations | Structura National Technologies, ANO Dialog, Internet Development Institute (ANO IRI) |
Key Takeaway
The SDA is not just a single troll farm or PR agency, but the core of an entrepreneurial, state-backed network that has redefined Russian digital propaganda since 2022. Its operations are global, persistent, and strategically focused on maximizing the Kremlin’s influence by any digital means necessary